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general population. The search for a diagnostic category or biomarker that would serve this purpose is an ongoing endeavour for research and clinical communities.
This research, however, has been problematic, leading some commentators to argue that the categories and standards that support the work of clinicians and researchers ‗reveal increasing ambiguity rather than clarity' (Gaines & Whitehouse, 2006: 62) , in that boundaries are becoming less certain than before between normal aging and dementia, on the one hand, and different types of dementia --Vascular dementia, Lewy-Body dementia or Fronto-temporal dementia--on the other.
In this paper, we investigate how clinicians and researchers, in collaboration with regulatory institutions and pharmaceutical companies, come to frame these uncertainties and re-deploy them in the ‗collective production' of new diagnostic conventions and bioclinical standards. Our point of departure is that such practices are concerned with a distinctive type of objectivity, regulatory objectivity, that focuses on the establishment of conventions through collectively concerted programs of action (Cambrosio et al. 2006 ). This form of objectivity is particularly suited to the complex, non-linear relationships established between laboratory biology and the clinic in contemporary medicine, in which hybrid bio-clinical entities are set up to mediate the relationship between those settings (Keating & Cambrosio, 2003) . In this context, the establishment of conventional standard and systems of regulation are viewed as endogenous requirements for ongoing knowledge production, innovation and clinical work rather than forms of external control. Here, we offer a detailed view of the collective, reflexive work that is entailed in making such conventions.
The paper focuses on one such conventional standard: Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). MCI is a concept originally coined by the American neurologist Ronald Petersen to describe a transitional stage between normal cognitive aging and dementia (Petersen et al. 1999; Petersen, 2003) . Our interest in it is that it was also explicitly devised as an attempt to bridge emerging biomolecular models of Alzheimer's disease progression with secondary prevention therapies being devised in laboratories at the turn of the 21 st century and the perceived increase in the presentation of ‗mild memory problems' in the clinic around the same period ). According to this view, MCI was to bring together the laboratory and the clinic into one common ground of understanding Alzheimer's disease. That this view was not generally and immediately accepted in the field of dementia research, practice and policy provide us with the opportunity to analyse an 3 aspect of regulatory objectivity that has remained hitherto unexplored: how are conventional standards put together. In the paper, we explore the processes through which conventional standards are proposed, criticised, evaluated and re-configured to serve the purpose of a diverse and changing configurations of actors and settings.
While drawing on ethnographic, documentary and interview data documenting the scientific, clinical and political controversy around MCI, i the paper analyses one single turning point in this process: the proceedings of an international meeting about MCI organised by the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drug Advisory
Committee of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2001 (Food and Drug Administration, 2001 ). The policies and agenda laid at this meeting came to shape most of the subsequent basic, clinical and therapeutic research in this area as well as the clinical guidelines and consensus groups held on MCI to this day Winblad et al. 2004; Gauthier et al. 2006) . Furthermore, in this meeting, for the first time in its history, the FDA asked one of its committees ‗to address some fundamental aspects of a particular diagnosis …, and decide if it exists and how best it ought to be studied' (Food and Drug Administration 2001) , rather than considering a licensing application for a specific drug. As such, this meeting constitutes an important resource not only to understand the history of MCI as a conventional bioclinical entity, but more importantly to examine regulatory objectivity in action.
The main finding of this analysis is that actors' assessments of ‗evidence' and reflexive engagement with conventional aspects of their practice, which Cambrosio and colleagues consider central to regulatory objectivity, are both embedded in an ongoing ‗collective production of uncertainty'. We argue that uncertainty should be understood not merely as the ‗context of' bioclinical collectives' search for rules and conventions but also as an achievement endogenous to --and essential for --the dynamics of those collectives (Bourret & Rabeharisoa, 2008) .
ii From this perspective, uncertainty is not a socio-cognitive ambivalence experienced by individuals in complex decision-making situations (Fox, 1959; Fox, 2000) Our empirical focus is on the practical accomplishment of uncertainty, on two levels. First, we are interested in uncertainty as a way of framing the organisation of knowledge production, technological development and policy formulation in domains characterised by controversy and indeterminacy (Callon, 1998) . In the first section of this paper, we describe how epistemic, technological and political changes in the field of AD worked together to unsettle the relations between laboratories, clinics, and regulatory and 4 policy institutions established at the end of the 1970's. We will then suggest that the emergence of prodromal dementia categories, such as MCI, can be seen as attempts to wane the proliferation of uncertainties in this domain iii , and that, in this respect, the FDA 2001 MCI meeting represents a key collective effort to frame this process. This last point relates to our second understanding of uncertainty as a discursive, interactive accomplishment. Here, we draw from Lynch's (1998) ‗deconstructive' investigations of forensic DNA profiling as a sociology of knowledge machine provides an insight into the power of settings such as courts in transforming ands unsettling stable socio-technical arrangements. But while Lynch's investigation was anchored on STS' conceptual opposition between stability and uncertainty, our focus was on how participants in the FDA meeting collaboratively exposed the uncertainties and the historical contingencies of the conventions that support their activities at one particular time in order to construct another explicitly contingent category. In the main section of the paper, we examine how this was achieved by a) predicating the exploration of uncertainties about MCI upon the definition of the political boundaries for the collective, b) redistributing uncertainty to adjacent domains, and c) drawing from this extended uncertainty to formulate a policy of articulation between research and clinical practice based on the transience of MCI as a category. Through these procedures, actors invested an uncertain and transient conventional category with the power to mediate and organise the exploration of indeterminacies and ambiguities about dementia and its treatment. We suggest that the collective production of uncertainty should be seen not as the reverse but as constituent to the temporary stabilisation of biomedicine's knowledge and entities in the clinic, laboratory and regulatory fora. In these types of setting, STS' lines of enquiry might be more useful than they have been in the courts (Lynch and Cole, 2005) Bioclinical Uncertainty in Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementias
In the historiography of Alzheimer's disease (Ballenger, 2006) , it is generally accepted that the re-awakening of interest in senile dementia in the 1960's was sparked by the publication of studies led by Martin Roth and colleagues at Newcastle 5 (UK), which correlated the number of neuritic plaques in patients' brains with the scores obtained by those patients in cognitive tests (Roth et al. 1966) . Developments in electron microscopy in the early 1960's had fostered a re-description of the neuropathological features of dementia at the ultra-structural level (Kidd, 1963; Terry, 1963) and this created interest in neurobiology among neuropathologists. This interest reshaped Alzheimer's disease during the 1970's, and was the basis for a number of etiological theories that were proposed in that decade, the most important of which addressed the possibility of a scrapie-like virus, toxic effects of aluminium in the brain and a deficit of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. This last hypothesis, supported by neurochemistry studies that linked the cholinergic system in the brain and the cognitive deficits observed in patients suspected to have Alzheimer's disease, became the focus of a considerable proportion of the Alzheimer's disease research in the late 1970's and early 1980's (Davies & Maloney, 1976; Perry et al. 1977; Whitehouse et al. 1982) .
These advances in the understanding of the biology of the disease were accompanied by an intensive process of characterization of the disease processes from a clinical/behavioural perspective. Already in synchrony with the Newcastle correlation studies, Blessed, Tomlinson and Roth had developed an informant-based instrument to assess memory, concentration and orientation (Ballenger, 2006) . This was followed by a series of tools aiming to measure mental status, such as the Mini Mental Status Exam (Folstein et al. 1975) , tests concerned with ‗clinically observable deterioration' such as Global Deterioration Scale (GDS) (Flicker et al., 1991) , and others aimed at assessing behavioural changes, or cognitive performance. The multiplication of instruments, the establishment of the Alzheimer's Disease Research Centres in the US and, in part energized by these new centres, the perceived increase in demand for dementia care, created the context for a consensus conference that set criteria for the clinical diagnosis of AD (McKhann et al. 1984) . The establishment of this ‗conventional standard' supported clinical diagnoses of AD, which themselves embodied a vision of the integration between research, therapeutic experimentation and clinical practice (Moreira, in press ).
This envisioned coherence was, however, not solely the product of a spontaneous self-organising process between research and clinical constituencies. In a crucial way, this coherence had been framed and shaped by the efforts of the National Institute of Aging (NIA), particularly after the nomination of Zaven Khachaturian as (Fox 1989) . The ‗politics of anguish' and the activities of the Alzheimer's Association were key in the NIA's efforts to obtain budget increases from the US Congress, as well as its efforts to crystallize a new political understanding of old age and its changing dynamics (Holstein, 2000) . In this context, it was possible for this bioclinical collective to establish itself in the public arena, with further the assistance of expert calculations of the dimension of the ‗problem of dementia' in the US (Katzman, 1976) .
The alignment between the worlds of research, clinical practice, politics and patient advocacy that underpinned the emergence of the bioclinical collective for AD was, however, built upon shifting foundations. The same molecular techniques that had first energised AD research in the 1970's were already, during the 1980's, suggesting possible alternatives to the ‗cholinergic hypothesis'; alternatives that were linked to the therapeutic implications of the solubility of amyloid in the neuritic plaques found in brains of patient with Alzheimer's disease (Glenner & Wong, 1984) .
Also it was becoming clear that expectations, fostered during 1970s and 80s, for a ‗rational', unproblematic translation of the cholinergic hypothesis into safe pharmacology were unrealistic. When results of clinical trials of cholinesterase inhibitors (ChEIs) started surfacing in the 1990s, the expectations in the clinical research community had been already significantly lowered (Moreira, in Press) .
Drawing on a genetic model of the pathogenesis of early-onset AD, the bioclinical collective of AD appeared, during the 1990s, to focus its attention and therapeutic hopes on what became known as the ‗amyloid cascade hypothesis' (Hardy and Higgins, 1992) . Despite its success, controversy about the validity of the theory increased over the years, as competing theories were proposed that emphasized the role of the tau protein in the formation of axonal ‗tangles' (Lovestone & Reynolds, 1997) , upstream oxidative stress (Nunomura et al. 2006) , or the dynamics of protein folding.
This multiplication of hypotheses was further compounded by the evolving relationship between different types of dementia. While the definition of AD proposed the during the 1970s relied on its differentiation from the vascular models of dementia that had been popular before (Ballenger, 2006) , during the 1990's new work 7 demonstrated that vascular pathologies, notably atherosclerosis, white matter lesions, and mid-life arterial hypertension, were associated with AD and could enhance cognitive loss (Humpel & Marksteiner, 2005 (Brayne & Calloway, 1988; Anonymous, 1989) . Another consequence of the establishment of standardised diagnostic criteria for AD was the emergence of fractures within the space of representation for dementia. As a variety of professions became involved in the care of AD patients, different accounts of the reality of AD and the needs of patients started surfacing.
One of most significant of these fractures resulted in the emergence of a coherent psychosocial model of dementia in the late 1980's developed by Tom Kitwood and others (Kitwood 1993 ). This psychosocial model criticized the biomedical model of 8 dementia (Bond, 1992) , and generated a concern for patients as a ‗persons'. It changed the focus of research and drew attention to patients' personal needs, and has underpinned much of the criticism about the imbalance of attention and investment between the two main axes of the dementia health policy: the ‗search for a cure' and the organisation of ‗care'.
Mild Cognitive Impairment and 'the FDA Meeting'
In the past decade or so, the AD bioclinical collective appears to have experienced fundamental uncertainty at all levels, from the understanding of the basic pathogenesis of the condition, to clinical practice and health policy. These uncertainties cannot be understood in absolute terms, but only in relation to the coordination achieved in the field during the 1980's, on the one hand, and the emergent agreement within the collective that only preventative strategies could tackle the progression and lower the prevalence of AD, on the other. Despite their multiplicity, most of the hypotheses circulated in the field have attempted to identify the ‗first event' in the pathological process leading to clinical dementia, and have suggested therapeutic approaches to halt the progression. This perspective encouraged increased interest in identifying pre-clinical stages of dementia (Lock, 2006) . In this process, prodromal dementia categories were positioned as possible re-articulations between different types of laboratories -molecular biology, neuropathology, neuropsychology, neuroimaging, etc. --and the clinic, in an attempt to ‗cool down' or stabilise some of the uncertainties discussed in the last section.
One of the most successful re-articulations was the concept of Mild Cognitive Impairment. Originally conceived as a specific stage on the GDS scale (Flicker, Ferris et al. 1991) , it was only in the end of the 1990's that, by the hand of Ronald Petersen and colleagues at the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, it came to be embody such potential for intermediation between the laboratory and the clinic (Petersen, Smith et al. 1999) . As was suggested in the last section, the shifting understanding of the pathogenesis of AD, combined with the ‗modest' clinical effects of ChEIs, led to a reorientation of basic and therapeutic research. It was thus possible to observe that, during the 1990's this bioclinical collective moved towards a new therapeutic vocabulary that emphasized the ability for molecular compounds to be ‗disease modifying' (Moreira, in Press) . Research groups became increasingly interested in finding pharmacological agents that would target the molecular mechanisms that precede neuronal death (amyloid aggregation, etc). This trend also encapsulated the idea that these agents would only be effective when used before such pathological molecular processes manifested themselves clinically. It is widely recognised that it is very difficult to evaluate such therapies, both because they are more likely to off-set the risk-benefit ratio acceptable for non-symptomatic individuals involved in clinical trials, and because they require larger, longer and more expensive types of trial design (see, for example, Citron, 2004) . MCI also presented new opportunities for ChEIs marketing licence holders.
Because there was an accepted view that ChEIs had moderate effects on cognitive abilities and clinical symptoms of dementia, it was possible to argue that such effects would be more significant in milder stages of the disease. This obviously would also represent an extension of the market for ChEIs. In addition, in previous years there had been controversy about whether the outcomes chosen by the FDA to evaluate anti-dementia drugs -change in cognitive scores plus one global measure of functioning (Leber, 1990 ) -were the most appropriate given that, as one coalition of researchers put it, ‗[t]he maintenance of baseline levels in … Alzheimer's disease may be a more relevant goal to … individual patients than transient cognitive improvement' (Winblad et al. 2001: 656) . From this perspective, MCI could become an important tool to trace the evolution of these baseline scores in a population at ‗risk'. The recognition of MCI patients as a ‗target population' by the FDA, in fact, would be an important step in changing the evaluation framework that was (and still is) seen to constrain the evaluative performance of ChEIs.
MCI brought together the interests of a multiple array of actors and constituencies who identified the FDA as a crucial mediator in this process. This was materialised in a number of requests to the FDA by companies asking to develop treatments for MCI (Food and Drug Administration, 2001: 10) . This created a particular problem for the FDA because its approval of any specific product is linked, through the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, to how the product is presented in its ‗product label' and, as Dr. Katz, representing the FDA, said in his opening address to the meeting, to ‗whether or not the population for whom the drug is intended can be unambiguously described' (Food and Drug Administration, 2001: 11) . The FDA thus had to take the unusual step of assessing the validity, reliability and sensitivity of a bioclinical construct, and of evaluating whether the existing ambiguities of the concept were likely to disappear or increase.
In order to take that step, the FDA' Reisberg, a geriatric psychiatrist particularly concerned with the clinical significance of subjective memory impairment (Flicker et al. 1991) ; Dr. Ganguli, general psychiatrist and epidemiologist of dementia, a ‗friendly sceptic' towards the concept (Ganguli et al. 2004 ); Dr. Ferris, a psychologist, collaborator of Dr. Reisberg; Dr.
Shah, psychologist and proponent of the cognitive testing approach to dementia screening; and one representative of an European drug development team, Dr.
Waegemans. In addition, various (mainly expert) participants in the audience were allowed to ask questions to the panel.
The panel and speakers were asked to answer and discuss the following 
The Collective Production of Uncertainty
The FDA meeting's agenda was aligned with the emerging epistemic and biomedical expectations of the collective that were referred to in the beginning of the last section.
In setting the meeting, its organisers were required to ‗translate' these expectations and processes into a confined space (Callon, 1986) . This transposition entailed the coordination of persons, spaces and materials that together could ‗make present' the complex interrelations of a bioclinical collective. In this ‗the FDA meeting' shared a number of characteristics with clinical practice guideline development meetings, in particular the focus on the interaction between the discussion within the meeting and the ‗outside world', both as context of production of the issues discussed in the meeting, and as context of reception of the documents and policies assembled at the meeting (Moreira, 2005) . 
Putting a Fence Around a Mystery
The main challenge the FDA faced in preparing this meeting was to balance the representation of the various perspectives about MCI proposed in the field with the need to achieve an accountable outcome within the given time constraints. 11)
The shift in the epistemic status of MCI from ‗a condition' to an ‗alleged' reality or ‗presumed' diagnosis is striking. But Dr. Katz does more than just deepen the doubt that he and the FDA are prepared to cast upon MCI, he also sets up the basic rules of the ‗sociology of knowledge machine' of the meeting (Lynch, 1998 In Dr. Ganguli's view of the link between these two issues is evidently problematic:
by putting the two together, the FDA and, for that matter, the rest of the presenters, were defining MCI as a suitable stage to test and probably use new, preventative therapies for AD. For her, the question of whether or not MCI is an entity ‗out in the trenches' precedes the formulation of a therapeutic or public health strategy.
Following this exchange, various participants suggest possible estimations of prevalence of MCI in the general population, none of them actually supported by data, which leads Dr. Kawas to the conclusion that ‗what we need to do to find the estimate that people are looking for is to go back to the trenches' (p. 138).
The FDA's ‗sociology of knowledge machine' appears to have worked here to reduce the conflict between the two versions of how to define the uncertainty of MCI.
Furthermore, the co-existence and proposed synchronicity of a programme of epidemiological research with a programme of therapeutic research also represents a different approach to the management of uncertainty proposed by Dr. Ganguli. While hers is a staged approach where the contours of the problem have to be defined before thinking how to tackle it, the FDA's proposal was one of maximising possible uncertainties. Importantly, the FDA proposal also opened up the possibility of a future alignment between the epidemiology of MCI, its extended clinical use as diagnostic category, and the implementation of therapeutic strategies.
One important aspect of this policy of opening a future where differences might coordinate is that it relied on cautious surveillance over the black boxing processes The significance of these interventions has to do with the interaction between what Dr. Belle called the ‗fence' and the ‗mystery'. The discursive production of the mystery within the meeting was deployed through an exploration of the uncertainties surrounding MCI -whether it is one thing or a complex syndrome with heterogeneous symptoms, whether it is early AD or an entity in itself, etc. The committee's dissatisfaction with the answers provided by the speakers enabled the participants to widen the collective that was concerned with this ‗entity's' probable existence: whereas at the beginning of the meeting, MCI was located within a few research clinics, the exploration of uncertainties in the relation between these sites and the ‗real world' (of everyday clinical practice) or epidemiological and biomolecular research provided a new, extended set of possible relations for MCI.
The successful management of this collective exploration of uncertainty depends upon the construction of boundaries for the collective. As Michel Callon and
Vololona Rabeharisoa (1998) have argued, this task is intrinsically political, as it relates to the ability to stabilise a ‗forum' of debate and, through its procedures of debate, to determine the collective's extension and composition in a form of dynamic containment. The composition of the ‗fence' that Dr. Belle was referring to is thus intimately associated with his suggestion that ‗an institution or group should come to some agreement'. Similar suggestions were reiterated throughout the meeting.
Together, they lead us to the view that the FDA committee was attempting to establish a continuity between this meeting and future meetings as a basis for the extended collective they had just reshaped. This was achieved through a careful articulation between different types of uncertainty.
Redistributing Uncertainty
The collective production of uncertainty about MCI at the FDA meeting and the correlated establishment of procedures and actors to manage it was itself a risky strategy. Why would the FDA and the collective they supported be invested in a Dr. CHUI: … I think that because MCI is the frontier now we might be assuming that the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease is firm. We have dropped the terminology probable Alzheimer's disease, possible
Alzheimer's disease, and here we are just using Alzheimer's disease. One particularly interesting aspect of this strategy is how the ‗firmness' of the clinical standard for the diagnosis of AD is undone by referring to other standards --the CERAD criteria or, in Dr. Chui's case, evidence-based medicine criteria for grading diagnostic procedures (Sackett et al. 2000) . The problematic nature of the AD diagnostic standard could then be compared with the problems the FDA committee was exploring in relation to MCI diagnostic criteria. This suggested that accepting the uncertainties of MCI would require acknowledging the quasi arbitrariness of AD (Whitehouse, 2001) . That the focus of this comparison was the clinical setting should not be surprising because it is in such settings -the Alzheimer's centres -that the participants had invested hope in finding consistency and validity for MCI.
Furthermore, this amounted to a challenge to the FDA's approved labelling of dementia drugs based on clinical trials of patients diagnosed with AD through those criteria. Some of the participants in the FDA meeting seemed to be suggesting that if the ambiguity of MCI was reason for the FDA to be cautious about extending labelling of existing drugs, so should the ambiguity of AD have been a barrier to their approval in the first place.
The solution to this challenge led participants to explore the historicity of their conventions. Interestingly, it was left to the representative from the ‗real world', Dr. Dr. Kawas' interest in the possibility of MCI being used in the clinic is couched in the idea that not only does MCI take work to be made visible but also it takes work to shape this form of diagnostic criteria This is also contained in Dr Waegemans' reply, which emphasised the time lag that takes to make conventions usable in the clinic.
Such an understanding of AD diagnosis was unproblematic for most of the participants, who had experienced the process of implementing the NINCDS criteria during their professional training or practice. From their perspectives, the adoption process was independent from the problems of diagnostic accuracy for AD. It was as if participants were suggesting that it was possible to implement consistent diagnostic conventions regardless of their accuracy.
By highlighting the historical character of diagnostic criteria for AD, participants at the FDA meeting shifted the burden of responsibility on MCI proponents. It was then possible to ask, as did Dr. Duara ‗are we applying an unreasonable standard … to MCI when we are [asking] do we have well defined standards?' (p. 278). One important consequence of this change, in light of what was argued in the last section, was that the uncertainty of AD diagnostic criteria became part of the wider problem for the collective in which MCI was the key mediating entity. Embracing AD diagnosis in the MCI strategy of uncertainty management meant also that this collective was not only concerned with differences on a synchronous level, but also was committed to re-writing the history of AD. As one of us has argued elsewhere, drawing on the case of neurosurgery, the production of dis/continuities in the history of collectives is essential for the practical achievement of ‗innovation' (Moreira, 2000) . Similarly, to make MCI possible, AD had to become close to being a contingent outcome of history.
The Strength of Transient Entities
There were however consequences from investing in this strategy of extended uncertainty for MCI itself. If AD diagnostic criteria were a product the past, who could say that the same would not happen to MCI in a few years time? Why would clinicians need to question something that, despite its inaccuracies, still ‗did its job', and why shouldn't they trust MCI as a category if there was no certainty about its 23 foundations? The remarkable solution that participants devised for this problem demonstrates how conventions are integral for action and for generating knowledge within bioclinical collectives (Cambrosio et al. 2006 While, as we know, the FDA committee was not prepared to agree with Dr.
Ferris' version of the diagnostic reliability of MCI criteria, his proposal that MCI trials become a ‗bridge between symptomatic trials and the ultimate goal of disease prevention trials' seemed acceptable. Of course, by accepting this proposal, the FDA committee also would be agreeing that MCI is an indication for the drugs tested in those trials. This might have been construed as a direct challenge to Dr. Katz's contention, discussed earlier, that the FDA must adhere to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, except for the fact that the committee had first-hand knowledge of the convoluted relations between nosological knowledge and therapeutic evaluation. Dr.
Temple of the FDA used the example of cardiovascular drugs to describe these relations:
I think the history of these kinds of difficulties is that you do the best you can, and that sometimes things happen to enable you to distinguish things that you formerly felt were the same better than you could before.
Sorry to use another cardiovascular example, but we now know that heart failure comes in two flavours and that the treatments are widely different depending on whether your problem is the ventricular beat systolic function or filling, diastolic function. And, the drugs that work in one don't necessarily work in the other and might even be adverse.
But for decades people didn't realize this and all of the above got included in clinical trials. That probably decreased the effectiveness of certain treatments but since we didn't know any better and the net effect was beneficial the drugs were approved for undifferentiated heart failure. Now that we are smarter we won't do that anymore. So, the situation conceivably, I guess, could be the same here …. Ferris proposition that MCI trials are a bridge between therapeutic ‗paradigms'. If it was possible to conduct an MCI trial, one would be testing not only the drugs in question but also the design of the trial, and consequently the adequacy of MCI as an entry point, an indication for drugs and as diagnostic entity (Vos, 1991) . The circularity of the process was predicated upon the ability to transfer the collective from one MCI ‗paradigm' to another. If MCI were here to stay, it would lose its heuristic role..
It is important to stress that by accepting the heuristic, bridging role of MCI, the FDA meeting does more than legitimise an idea that was already in circulation in As a temporary mediator, MCI would allow them to explore the uncertainties that concerned this collective.
The collective production of uncertainty is embedded in actors' reflexive work on the historicity of conventional standards. This suggests that participants in ‗the FDA meeting' were acting as ‗practical historians' (Garfinkel in Lynch and Bogen 1996: 62) and that the collective production of evidence required actors to engage with the organisational and political work that assembled documented past and present conventions. Unearthing the contingent relations and processes that sustained the emergence of past conventions did not, however, lead participants to seek a more permanent foundation for the conventions they were creating. The transience of those conventions was in fact their main attraction, in that they were built to effect a transition between one stage and another, between one set of relations and another.
The influence of the policies endorsed in ‗the FDA meeting' --that MCI could symptoms of memory loss in older persons should be taken seriously, since they may represent the beginning of Alzheimer's disease, andonce more effective early interventions are available -it will be critical to ask patients about these symptoms and learn to recognize them as early as possible. (Blacker, 2005) The clinical significance of MCI derived from its ability to produce measurable effects in a clinical trial. In this it might have helped that results were clearly -significantly --negative for Vitamin E and -not so significantly -for Donepezil on the conversion of MCI to AD. Nevertheless, the circularity between 27 conventional standards, therapy and therapeutic evaluation (Vos, 1991; Lakoff, 2005: 173-74), which had been set up in the FDA meeting, resurfaced in a clear message by a leading medical journal endorsing the use of MCI in the clinic.
In addition, only by reference to ‗the FDA meeting' is it possible to understand that, while or even before such general endorsement took place, the main proponent of MCI, Dr. Petersen, could write these words in the leading monograph on the topic:
Ultimately, MCI is likely to be a heuristic concept. It has generated and will continue to spawn research on aging and early cognitive impairment. At some point the term will be discarded and another will take its place. Hopefully, the concept will have contribute to an understanding of the spectrum of cognition from normal aging to AD (Petersen, 2003: 12) Accepting the transience of MCI may have been the price its proponents had to pay for bringing it into the ‗real world'.
Conclusion
Social science research on regulatory practices in medicine has examined changes in the social organisation of medical work, new forms of medical innovation, evidencebased medicine, shifts in professional autonomy, and the positioning of users.
Analytical emphases tend to fall either on exogenous or endogenous drivers of regulation. The consolidation of biomedicine in recent decades has put the boundaries of medicine in question (Gaudilliere, 2002; Clarke et al. 2003; Keating & Cambrosio, 2003) , and it is argued that regulatory bodies such as the FDA are integral to the dynamics of biomedicine (Cambrosio et al. 2006 ). This paper focused on how regulatory bodies fulfil such role by exploring how their ‗knowledge machinery' frames the collective production of new diagnostic conventions and standards.
Our close analysis of the FDA meeting on MCI suggests that the deployment of uncertainty is reflexively implicated in bioclinical collectives' search for rules and conventions, and that the collective production of uncertainty is in fact central to the ‗knowledge machinery' of regulatory objectivity. We have shown that a) the reflexive achievement of uncertainty is predicated upon collectives' (re)building of sociotechnical boundaries, b) that these boundaries facilitate the re-opening of surrounding epistemic, technical and social black boxes, and c) that it is possible for some collectives to reflexively agree on the temporary, historical nature of their foundations. We suggest further that the process we have described constitutes a general feature of biomedicine's epistemic and technological dynamics, in that the production and temporary stabilisation of biomedicine's knowledge and entities requires continuous ‗uncertainty work' in the clinic, laboratory and regulatory forum.
This conclusion is relevant for understanding current changes in research, clinical management, and policy on dementia. As we have shown, in the aftermath of the FDA meeting, MCI came to embody the promise of new therapeutic developments and diagnostic practices for Alzheimer's disease. However, it could only do so by re-articulating the definition of AD. Some commentators even suggested that it has brought about the ‗end' of AD (Whitehouse, 2001 ). There are benefits and drawbacks to such re-articulation. One the one hand, MCI contributed to an increased recognition of the uncertainty around the causes of AD and fostered research within a multifactorial framework in which specific and non-specific compounds -for example, statins (Panza et al. 2006 ) --co-exist with lifestyle interventions for preventing (or delaying) dementia. On the other hand, the research and policy focus on MCI and upstream, precursor biomolecular events in the natural history of the disease has meant that downstream processes and symptoms are receiving less attention (and resources). This has resulted in a growing imbalance between the interests and needs of people who already have dementia or are close to developing it and those who will possibly benefit from preventative strategies in the future as a result of the changes in the field of dementia research.
Finally, the paper leads to the suggestion that in the exploration of uncertainties around and underpinning bioclinical conventions, actors and institutions could do worse than seek the assistance and collaboration of STS academics. Our attention to uncertainty, contingency and multiplicity could, in this particular setting, help not only in unearthing the links that tie present conventions together but also in building new, required supports for knowledge making and clinical work. This however might prove more challenging than the examination Cole endured in his admissibility hearing (Lynch and Cole, 2008) in that instead of positionings along dichotomies of belief and credibility, institutions might require ‗proof' of enduring political commitment to the collective (see ‗Putting a fence around a mystery').Accepting the stability of our alliances may be the price we have to pay for being able to explore the uncertainties of biomedicine from within. observation of fieldwork in a dementia clinic and in neuropathology laboratory; e) symposia and research-user workshops . A systematic search strategy was used to identify relevant literature through MedLine (1350 refs). Conventional methods of historical research were used to identify key research papers. We developed ethnographic fieldwork at seven international biomedical conferences, which entailed qualitative, participant observation of communication in the relevant fields. We also conducted 37 interviews with international experts in dementia research, care and policy. These were qualitative semi-structured interviews on the scientific, clinical and societal meanings of MCI and/or early diagnosis and prevention of dementia. We used a stratified purposive sampling strategy, according to field of expertise, country and gender, having as main selection criteria the publication of relevant scientific, clinical or policy research on MCI identified through the literature review. In symposia and a research user workshop, potential users of the results of the project --researchers, clinicians, carers and patients --were invited to discuss the outcomes of the project and to consider how this research might move forward to influence and benefit older people with memory problems. See Moreira & Bond (2008) , .
ii The concept of ‗bioclinical collective' aims to capture the extended, heterogeneous, distributed character of the production of evidence that is required by the contemporary intersections between laboratory and the clinic. As the name suggests, such collectives are characterised by a concern around an hybrid entity or category that is neither wholly derived from clinical observation nor from laboratory experimentation (Keating and Cambrosio, 2003) . The conceptual genealogy of the concept can be traced back to Callon and Law's (1995) notion of hybrid collective as an alternative to social network or ‗society' because as Latour concisely explains, ‗Unlike society, which is an artefact imposed by the modernist settlement, this terms refers to the association of humans and non-humans. While the division between nature and society renders invisible the political process by which the cosmos is collected in one livable whole, the word collective makes this process central. Its slogan could be ‗no reality without representation'‖ (Latour, 1999: 304) . This concept was further developed by Callon and Rabeharisoa (1998) in their notion of the patient collective as an unfolding compositions of bodies, competences, representations artefacts, procedures and emotions gathered together by particular activities around a particular condition/illness. As with these concepts, the notion of bioclinical collective aims to emphasise the way in which links between heterogeneous entities are deployed in the representation -the convention in this case-that bring them into being. For this reason, who and what belongs to a particular collective and in what capacity is mostly an empirical that is related to the activity at hand.
